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HULL WELCOMES PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY

MR. HULL's address on American foreign policy, broadcast on Easter Sunday, was an honest and painstaking attempt to answer many of the anxious questions that have troubled the public mind. Its cardinal point—not always heeded by some official spokesmen—was the recognition that our foreign policy is “the task of focusing and giving effect in the world outside our borders to the will of 135,000,000 people through the constitutional processes which govern our democracy.” It follows from Mr. Hull's own definition that the citizens of this democratic society, in order to participate intelligently and effectively in such constitutional processes, must have a modicum of information not only about the basic principles of foreign policy—which Mr. Hull has stated on many occasions—but also on their application in practice. This Mr. Hull did on April 9 in a far more enlightening manner than had been done by any American official in the past three years.

STRENGTH DETERMINES U.S. POLICY. From the bitter experience of the past decade the Secretary drew one lesson not yet sufficiently appreciated by the public: and that is that the influence and effectiveness of the United States in world affairs are in direct ratio to its strength—not potential, but actual. If this country has had to make unpalatable compromises, that has been due not to sinister machinations on the part of the State Department or other government agencies, but often to sheer inability to implement high-minded purposes with concrete action. Since our people were for a long time reluctant both to recognize the need for such action, and to make the adjustments that would have permitted it, the public must share with its elected and appointed representatives the blame for past failures. The question left unanswered by Mr. Hull and other spokesmen is whether the government made sufficient use of the ample information at its disposal during that fateful decade to prepare the public for the shocks

that were to come. Here really is the crux of the operation of foreign policy in a democratic society: Should the government, necessarily better informed than the public, give the public a lead? Or should it wait for a groundswell in public opinion—inevitably far in the wake of events—before it acts? And to what extent will it prove possible to reconcile the views of the executive and of Congress on issues of foreign policy? These are not matters of partisan politics; and they deserve to be discussed on the nonpartisan plane of national needs, on which Mr. Hull properly pitched his own analysis. For in the future, too, as the Secretary pointed out in discussing international organization, the United States will have to make grave decisions about the use of force—at that time, one must hope, for the preservation of peace.

ORDER, BUT NOT REACTION. To the many questions raised by our policy in Europe the Secretary gave a long-overdue answer in terms other than those of immediate military expediency. He pointed out Europe's crying need, after the war, for order in which its peoples can repair the ravages of war. No reasonable person familiar with the travail undergone by Europeans since 1914 could wish for revolution merely for the sake of revolution. What many had feared, however, was that the United States—and Britain—would regard order as synonymous with restoration, and even with reaction, irrespective of the wishes of the liberated peoples themselves. This fear Mr. Hull has endeavored most emphatically to dispel by declaring that “stability and order do not and cannot mean reaction.” Most significant of all, he stated that “it is important to our national interest to encourage the establishment in Europe of strong progressive popular governments, dedicated like our own to improving the social welfare of the people as a whole.” This affirmation had become urgently necessary after years

of sterile, negative contemplation of the European scene, which bade fair to leave the Russians, with their dynamic faith in their own ideas and practices, as sole standard-bearers of the future on the continent.

Even now mere affirmation of principles will not be enough. It will be tested, again and again, by every measure we take or fail to take. But at least a course has been publicly set. And Mr. Hull's statement on France, although it will not satisfy those who want recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation as the government of France, goes far to fill the vacuum that had hitherto threatened to develop in the wake of Allied invasion. Mr. Hull recognized the need for civil administration by Frenchmen—not by some Allied Military Government which would have put France on a par with one of the enemy countries. And he clearly indicated that such administration would be determined not by Allied military commanders who, through sheer necessity to maintain order, might have found it advisable to take over the Vichy administrative machinery save for Laval and a few of his associates. On the contrary, with a clarity never before displayed on French affairs, he said that he and the President are "disposed to see the French Committee of National Liberation exercise leadership to establish law and order under the supervision of the Allied Commander-in-Chief," and to give it "our cooperation and help in every practicable way." This should go far toward removing a state of uncertainty that had begun to cast a dark shadow over Franco-American relations.

In looking to the future, the Secretary left no doubt that the United States is committed to the

policy of working with other nations on the task of establishing an international organization concerned with political, economic and social problems, which would have force at its disposal. Such an international organization, he rightly said, must be based on an "enduring understanding" between the United States, Britain, Russia and China, as well as on co-operation among the other United Nations. He warned against looking to rigid formulas or detailed blueprints for solutions of rapidly changing problems. And he announced that he was inviting bipartisan committees of the House and Senate to discuss with him the proposals so far framed with respect to international organization.

Such discussion, which under our system of government is essential for the effective operation of constitutional processes, is particularly needed in an election year, when political moves on the home front may be too easily misinterpreted as major shifts of public opinion on international issues. An ill-informed electorate can become a suspicious, and hence a captious electorate. It is encouraging, therefore, that Mr. Hull should see in the demand for information on foreign affairs not mere idle curiosity, but genuine concern with the fate of the nation. As the Secretary has rightly said, the procedure of international negotiation is one "in which the people, who are sovereign, must not only educate their servants but must be willing to be educated by them." The people have demonstrated unmistakably their desire to be educated. Their chief complaint so far has been the meagerness of the educational fare spread before them at the most critical period in modern times.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

SOVIET-JAPANESE AGREEMENTS AID UNITED NATIONS

The increasingly sharp tone adopted by the Soviet press in referring to Japan emphasizes the diplomatic defeat suffered by the Japanese on March 30, when they signed an agreement in Moscow giving up their oil and coal concessions in northern Sakhalin. The island of Sakhalin, lying north of Japan proper, parallels Russia's Far Eastern coast for some distance. It was incorporated in Russian territory in the last century, but the southern half was ceded to Japan following the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 and is known by the Japanese name of Karafuto. The northern part, which remained in Russian hands, was occupied by Japanese troops in 1920 during the period of foreign intervention in Soviet territory, and was not evacuated until 1925. Tokyo then received valuable oil and coal concessions for a period of 45 years, and it is these concessions which have now been surrendered 26 years before their expiration date.

Certain details of the agreement are worth noting.

The U.S.S.R. is to pay Japan 5,000,000 rubles for the return of the concessions, a sum which amounts to less than \$950,000 at the official rate of exchange. Provision is also made for closing down the Japanese consulate-general at Alexandrovsk and vice-consulate at Okha—both in north Sakhalin—and the Soviet consulates at Hakodate and Tsuruga in Japan. Finally, the Russians are to supply Japan with 50,000 metric tons of oil annually from north Sakhalin on "customary commercial terms" during five consecutive years "following the end of the present war." According to a *New York Times* correspondent, it was stated authoritatively in Moscow that these sales would not begin until the end of the Pacific war—i.e., after the defeat of Japan.

STRICT RUSSIAN TERMS. At the same time that an accord was reached on the concessions, the Soviet-Japanese fisheries agreement, whose renewal has hitherto been the subject of bitter annual wrangling, was extended for a five-year period. It has

been characteristic of recent extensions of this pact, regulating Japanese fishing activities in Russian Far Eastern waters, that the Russian terms have become increasingly severe. The present accord is no exception to this rule.

Japanese payments in 1944 have been raised 6 per cent above the rents of 1943, which were, in turn, 4 per cent higher than those of 1942. Moreover, it is agreed that "until the end of this war" the Japanese may not fish "in certain fishing areas in the Far East established by the Soviet government in July 1941," i.e., shortly after the German invasion, when the possibility of a Japanese attack must have loomed large in the minds of Soviet leaders. The agreement also states that "fishing areas leased by Japanese subjects situated on the eastern coast of Kamchatka and in the Olutowski district are not to be exploited by Japanese lessees until the end of the war in the Pacific." Simultaneously, all restrictions on Soviet fishing in Russian Far Eastern waters—restrictions which the U.S.S.R. agreed to in the twenties when it had to tread softly in dealing with the Japanese—have been removed.

GAINS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS. Now that the main provisions of the new agreements have been given, it will be useful to summarize the resulting changes in the situation in the North Pacific.

1. From the Russian point of view, probably one of the most important features of the treaties is the fact that they abolish the last of the special foreign concessions on Soviet soil and the last of the restrictions on Soviet freedom of action at home, arising from the period of intervention during and after World War I.

2. The agreements will presumably increase the amount of oil and coal available to the Soviet Union in the Far East, especially since northern Sakhalin is the main Russian source of supply in this region. Increased supplies of oil and coal in Sakhalin might have a slight, indirect effect on the quantities of these

raw materials available to the Russians in the West.

3. Although it is impossible to estimate the effect on Japan of the loss of oil and coal from north Sakhalin, the results will clearly be of some benefit to the Allies in the Far Eastern war. This is likely to be especially true later on, after the Japanese have been expelled from the oil fields of the Indies.

4. Of particular significance is the exclusion of Japanese fishing boats from areas that could be of military value to Tokyo in observing developments in the Soviet Far East as well as in judging American activities in Alaska and the Aleutians. The clearing out of Japanese fishermen from these zones may be of considerable value to us in assuring the secrecy of future operations in the north Pacific.

CASH ON THE BARRELHEAD. One point not sufficiently stressed in newspaper comment is the fact that the north Sakhalin concessions were actually liquidated between March 15 and 25, preceding the publicly announced agreement of March 30. The Russians clearly were unwilling to accept a promissory note from the Japanese, and insisted that the oil and coal sites be surrendered before concluding the fisheries agreement. Why the Russians were careful to deal only on this basis is clear from their past experience. For the Soviet press has now revealed that upon signing the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941, Tokyo promised to give up the concessions, but later reneged. The pledge, Moscow newspapers have pointed out in caustic terms, was presumably not fulfilled because the Japanese had too much confidence in the power of the German armies that subsequently invaded the U.S.S.R. Here it is interesting to observe that *Izvestia*, official organ of the Soviet government, has declared quite bluntly that Japan's present amicability results from "the successes of the Red Army . . . and the development of the military operations of our Allies."

WILL RUSSIA FIGHT JAPAN? The agreements of March 30 naturally tell us nothing about whether the U.S.S.R. will ultimately go to war with Japan. Indeed, it may be surmised that the Japanese hope to insure continued peace with their neighbor by removing, as they have now done, some of the issues productive of friction in the past. Yet there is no doubt that the removal is being carried out at Japan's expense and that the Russians are declaring more strongly than ever before their solidarity with the Allies in the war against Japan. That these developments are appreciated in Washington and London is indicated by the favorable comment on the new treaties in dispatches from those Allied capitals.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

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
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Washington News Letter



APRIL 10.—One of the aims of the conversations which began over the Easter weekend in London between British representatives and an American delegation headed by Under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., is to reach agreement on application of the Atlantic Charter. One of the principal problems in our foreign policy today is to define the Charter in practical terms which our major allies will accept, and the American public will approve. In his broadcast of April 9 Secretary of State Cordell Hull said that "the Charter is an expression of fundamental objectives," not "a code of law from which detailed answers to every question can be distilled by painstaking analysis of its words and phrases."

CHARTER OF HOPE. When President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill made the Charter public on August 14, 1941, they intended it as a promise to peoples under Hitler's yoke of a better life in a post-war society governed by just principles. That it continues to serve this high purpose the Axis itself frequently acknowledges by the ridicule it heaps on it. When Mr. Hull included the Charter among his seventeen points of American foreign policy on March 22, the Nazi-controlled Transkontinent Press reported: "The attempt to represent the Atlantic Charter as still existing could not succeed in view of the well-known tendencies of Moscow's policy and the clearly visible capitulation of London and Washington to Soviet aspirations." The Axis has made clear, by the arbitrary and brutal character of its own "new order," that it cannot match the Charter's promises of self-determination, security, and freedom.

Twice in recent days the Transkontinent Press has been proved wrong in its contention that the Charter is dead. On March 30 Prime Minister Churchill told the House of Commons that "the Atlantic Charter and its principles remain our dominating aim and purpose." On April 3 Foreign Commissar V. M. Molotov stated that Russia would force no changes from the outside in "the social structure of Rumania as it exists at present."

The Charter's post-war effectiveness, however, will depend on agreement among the United Nations as to its precise meaning. Did the signatories assume a retroactive obligation when they pledged that "their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other"? The Soviet Union—which subscribed to the Charter by signing the United Nations Pact at the White House on January 1, 1942—claims the Baltic

Republics and the eastern territories of the pre-war Polish Republic, regions annexed after Germany started the war but before the Charter was signed. Will the United States agree with Churchill and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden that the Charter does not apply to the enemy in its ban on territorial changes "that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned"? How will the pledge of the signatories that they will "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live" be carried out—for example, in the controversial case of Eastern Poland?

Beyond the need for clarifying the meaning of the Charter's sweeping words lies the greater question of how the victorious Allies will interpret the Charter's general philosophy. The Charter's brief eight paragraphs set forth three principal goals: political freedom for nations on a basis of self-determination; "freedom from fear and want" for "all men in all the lands"; and "the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of security for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security." While the Charter's third paragraph states that the signatories "wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them," the London *Times* on March 20 argued that "the division of Europe today into 20 or 30 sovereign and independent units is incompatible with the military security and economic well-being of the European peoples." How can this view be reconciled with the promise of self-determination and sovereignty?

CHARTER A STAKE IN ELECTIONS. Whether the Charter ever becomes effective will depend above all on the 1944 Presidential elections in the United States. The isolationists and "nationalists" who oppose the Charter found encouragement last week in the failure of Wendell Willkie, outstanding internationalist among candidates for the Republican nomination, to win a single delegate in the Wisconsin primary of April 4. It is too early, however, to interpret the failure of Mr. Willkie, who on April 5 withdrew from the political campaign, as a return to isolationism. The candidates and platforms chosen by the major parties at their conventions this summer will tell more fully whether the international or the isolationist idea will prevail for the time being in the United States.

BLAIR BOLLES

(The third in a series of four articles on American foreign policy.)

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